After five years of effort and billions of tax dollars spent, the Bush Administration’s multi-layer approach to security has done little to secure our ports
Problems with cargo screening and manifests
Every manifest of all containers entering the US is screened. Foreign shippers are required to send the manifest to US Customs 24 hours before the containers are loaded. High security seals are used to lock the container doors and detect tampering with the container.
The problem—most terrorists do not mark their shipments as “weapons of mass destruction” and even with normal shipments the contents of the container do not match the manifest over 30 percent of the time.
Another problem—The destination port must check the number on each seal to make sure it hasn’t been cut off and replaced. The top, bottom, and sides of each container must also be inspected in case someone cut a hole to access the container.
“Trusted” shippers are supposed to submit true and accurate manifests and secure containers from tampering. Over 5,000 shippers and companies have applied and have been granted certification under the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. Shipments from certified shippers are given priority treatment and are subject to less inspections.
The problem—less than 500 of these shippers have been validated by the handful of inspectors hired by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and it will take three or more years to finish the job. The validation process is also very limited, as CBP makes no attempt to verify that all the security measures are actually in place. CBP sees this as a voluntary partnership and will work with shippers to decide which security elements and which locations will be inspected, so shippers know in advance when and where an inspection will take place.
CBP’s solution to the backlog?
If a shipper’s container is seized because of an illegal shipment, they get a higher priority for a validation inspection. ◆
Problems with the Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC)
Every port worker must have a tamper proof identity card and must pass a background and security check. This is the Transpiration Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) card which has taken the Bush Administration four years to get off the ground. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, in a press conference on April 25, 2006, called port workers and longshoremen “potentially the greatest risk to our security” and wants to start issuing the cards by the end of this year to 400,000 port workers. The next phase will cover 750,000 truck drivers, railway and vessel crews.
The problem—Longshore and port workers are not the greatest risk to port security. Every scenario involving our ports say the threat will come from the outside—a bomb inside a container, people smuggled inside a container, an attack from the land side, a small boat used to sink a container ship, or hijacking a ship Far from being a threat, port workers have been the first line of defense in making the ports safer.
More problems—Homeland Security received almost 2,000 comments about the TWIC cards and almost all of the comments pointed out why the “one card for everyone” program is a bad idea: TWIC duplicates existing identification systems and doesn’t work as well; it uses old technology and is more expensive then other types of cards; it is not flexible enough to use on existing door access control; it is not color coded to allow instant recognition of improper access; the smart cards used by TWIC are not difficult to hack; once hacked the card can be used at any facility; the use of fingerprints and PIN numbers is too complex and cumbersome; there is no relationship between criminal or arrest record and terrorism; the list of disqualifying reasons are too board and not shown to be relevant to security; the master list of suspected terrorists is faulty and includes names that should be removed; the faulty name list will produce a lot of false posi
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Problems with radiation
Every port will have radiation portal monitors to detect radioactivity. Honolulu received its first radiation portal monitor this April 2006. As of Feb. 2006, there were 143 radiation portal monitors (RPM) installed out of 300 sea ports. Including international airports, international mail facilities, border crossings, and other facilities a grand total of 670 RPMs have been installed at a cost of $300 million. Bush requested only $125 million for RPMs in the 2006 budget. At this rate, it will take 10 years to install the 3,034 monitors needed.
The problem—these monitors only detect moderately shielded radioactive materials and will not detect anything that is highly shielded.The portal monitors are very good at detecting kitty litter—one-third of the false alarms come from kitty litter. The machines are supposed to identify the source of radiation but are not working as they should. As a result, natural radiation from kitty litter, toilet bowls, floor tiles, and granite counter tops are producing a lot of false positives which waste a lot of time since every false alarm must be checked out.
Another problem, these monitors only detect radiation and do not detect dangerous chemicals or biological agents. Advanced Spectroscopic portal monitors can detect the chemicals but costs about $400,000 each.
A third problem is inadequate procedures and training. In December 2005, undercover inspectors from the Accountability Office (GAO) succeeded in transporting radioactive materials into the US from Mexico and Canada by using a fake letter from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The radiation monitors detected the radioactive materials but border guards were fooled by the fake letter.
High risk containers are scanned by gamma-ray machines which are supposed to catch the highly shielded material. To test this, in July 2004, ABC News shipped a briefcase containing 15 pounds of depleted uranium inside a lead-lined pipe. The briefcase was harmless but had the same radiation signature of a suitcase dirty bomb. It was shipped by rail from Hungry to Turkey then in a container to the port of New York where it was scanned but not detected. ABC News repeated the experiment in the port of Los Angeles in August 2004 by shipping the fake briefcase bomb in a container load of furniture from Jakarta, Indonesia.The container was flagged for x-ray screening since it came from Jakarta but again the container was cleared and the briefcase was not detected.
The problem—the gamma ray imaging takes about 40 seconds per container, but it takes a human operator another two minutes to analyze and interpret the image. It also requires a lot of experience and training to recognize a shielded weapon among other cargo. Because looking at the image would take too long, the images are stored and examined by a human operator only when there is a problem.
The gamma ray is also the most deadly of the x-ray machines available and poses a serious health hazard to dock workers and truck drivers. Gamma rays can penetrate the body and increases the risk of cancer or can cause radiation poisoning. ◆
Problems with automated computer systems
Customs and Border Protection uses the “Automated Targeting System” to screen 100 percent of the cargo manifest to catch the high risk containers.
The problem—No one knows if the system works. According to a March 30, 2006 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the system has still not been field tested to see if it actually works. Plans to test the system by shipping weapons or chemicals from various locations have not yet been conducted. There were delays in getting security clearances for the employees of the company contracted to do the test.
Another untested component is the validity of the risk factors programmed into the artificial intelligence software. Anyone who watches the TV series Numb3rs can tell you the wrong algorithm will give you the wrong answers. ◆